Criticism

Recent debate

A major criticism of quangos operating in the UK has been the argument of a democratic deficit.

This democratic deficit is said to be manifest in quangos’ lack of accountability to government and its citizens. Michael Gove, the Education Secretary said of quangos: ‘These organisations are expensive and by removing responsibility from ministers and handing it to unelected officials they reduce accountability’ (Harrison, 2010: BBC News). Gove also said that although ‘these organisations have done much valuable work’ he believes ‘there are too many of them’.

Cole identifies salient concerns about quangos which go back to the 1970s debate in Britain. These include worries about quangos as exceptionally numerous, wasteful and unaccountable organizations and comprise concerns about the general lack of information on quangos and about the scope of the sector (Cole, 2005: 321, 343). These concerns resonate with many of those expressed in current debate.

Too many quangos

Others such as Hirst identify the key issues of the quango debate around ‘the sheer number’ of quangos, something many other sources also confirm. Other issues include, ‘the scope and scale of the public functions’ that quangos perform, the high proportion of public expenditure that they administer’ and the ‘unrepresentativeness’ of their personnel (1995: 341).

Accountability

Hirst points out that the focus of public discussion of quangos is on the issue of accountability. Accountability in this way is from quangos to elected bodies and through them to people (1995: 342).

In ‘Members of the Board: Holding Quangos to Account’ the Tax Payers’ Alliance echoes concerns for the composition of the boards of quangos (2009: 1-3). Once more the main concerns expressed in the report are those of saving money and increasing democratic control of quangos so as to make them accountable to citizens. Three themes link all of these concerns. The first is the number of quangos in the UK, the second their costly and wasteful nature, and lastly their lack of accountability. Since these concerns are related and widely disseminated their foundations and what is meant by accountability (or lack thereof) must be explored.

‘Fundamentally, accountability is the process of judging an organizational action or result against a standard and then acting on that judgment’ (Andre´, 2001: 273). In quangos, ‘accountability is multidimensional’; It includes accountability to government and the public’ and ‘downward accountability’ to customers (Andre´, 2001: 273). The issue of accountability in quangos has roots in the source of their authority.

As Deacon and Monk explain, due to the fact that quangos’ political authority is conferred by the government rather than the electorate, they have been assumed to lack incentive to care whether public or other non-state sources knew of their activities or held them in esteem (Deacon & Monk, 2002: 27). This assumption has strengthened the common conception of quangos as closed, unaccountable and secretive organizations. It also implies that quangos are free to do as they like with government and citizens’ having no control over their actions.

Public financing

Greve, Flinders & Van Thiel however, point out that ‘the public financing of quangos…. gives politicians a strong instrument to influence quangos’ activities’ (1999: 140). Pliatzky also notes that the government can have an effect on the work of these bodies through the amount of public money it makes available. He concludes however, that ultimately the way this money is spent is responsibility of the councils (Pliatzky, 1992: 559).

Another report by the Tax Payers’ Alliance focuses on the expenditure of semi-autonomous public bodies (quangos) in the UK and suggests that these organizations are a possible area for cuts in funding to be made as a way to save money for the country. ‘Changes to the semi-autonomous sector of Government are vital in this, not only to reduce the burden on taxpayers, but to reintroduce accountability to decision making’ (Farrugia and O’Connell, 2009: 2). The report claims that ‘the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for monitoring the Government’s public bodies, applies the very narrowest possible definition of quango’ and that due to this, the true extent of the quango problem is not even broached (2009: 6).

Does cutting quangos improve accountability?

Nonetheless, whether cutting quangos’ funding or cutting quangos completely increases accountability depends on what organization or government department takes on those quangos’ functions and responsibilities.

Simply cutting quangos does not increase accountability because the service it may be providing or the purpose it may be serving may suffer unnecessarily as a result.  Cabinet Office Minister Francis Maude says that the changes (caused by the review of 901 quangos) ‘would usher in a new era of accountability by making ministers responsible for key decisions rather than unelected quangocrats’ (Shipman, 2010).

But Birrell notes that ‘it was recognised that an increase in accountability over quangos can be achieved through closer scrutiny and monitoring rather than by abolition and centralisation’ (2008: 45).

Hirst proposes that ‘the solutions to the general problem of accountability…. require that the traditional institutions of representative democracy be supplemented by new institutions that give greater power to citizens and that redraw the boundaries between public authority and civil society’ (1995: 342).